specifically the idea that such a norm, if valid, would provide guidance for belief formation.
Nor does it claim of the norm itself that it is not informative.
2 Moreover, the no guidance argument is supposed to turn on nothing more than quite intuitive claims about what guidance by a rule or norm amounts to. Since its rather condensed, and no doubt somewhat obscure, presentation in our original paper seems to have puzzled a number of commentators, we are very happy about this opportunity to further clarify this argument. We shall therefore start by spelling it out in more detail.
To be guided by a norm or rule R in our performances intuitively requires that R influences, or motivates, or provides reasons for, these performances. Correspondingly, to be capable of guiding performances, R intuitively needs to 'tell us' what to do under given circumstances. Our generic guiding rule thus can be taken to have the form (R) Do X when in C When deliberating whether to X, a subject S then can look to (R) for guidance. In order to get guidance as to whether to X from (R), however, S first needs to form a belief as to whether C -we shall follow Steglich-Petersen in calling C (R)'s 'antecedent condition' -is fulfilled.
3
If it is, this belief and (R) together provide S with a reason to X. For instance, being guided by the rule 'Buy low, sell high' requires, among other things, forming a belief about the market.
If I believe that the market is at a low, the rule gives me a reason to buy. This belief may of course be false, but this does not prevent the rule from influencing, or motivating, my behavior. Rather, it just means that, if the belief is false, I will (inadvertently) do the wrong thing. Guidance does not necessarily amount to correct performance.
2 In fact, we never use that term in our paper. We probably agree that the truth norm is, in some sense, informative -if that concept, and especially its application to norms, can be made clear enough. 3 One might argue that no such belief in the antecedent is required in cases where C are all or no circumstances. That might, or might not, be so.
But if we apply this intuitive picture of guidance to a norm like (N), strange things happen. (N) is supposed to provide guidance as to whether to believe that p. And just as with 'Buy low, sell high', being guided by (N) requires forming a belief as to whether its antecedent condition is fulfilled. 4 But for (N), determining whether C is fulfilled amounts to determining whether p is true. That is, it requires forming a belief as to whether p. This makes it intuitively very strange to think of (N) as guiding belief formation for two related reasons.
For one, in order to receive guidance as to whether to believe p from (N), I must first form a belief as to whether p. But that was the very question I wanted guidance on! Once I have formed a belief as to whether p, I simply do not need such guidance anymore. More precisely, since the very belief the formation of which (N) is supposed to influence, or motivate, needs to have been formed before (N) can exert any such influence, (N) cannot influence, or motivate, its formation.
5,6
But it is not only that (N)'s guidance, so to speak, necessarily comes too late. (N), secondly, is such that whatever conclusion I come to as to whether p, (N) 'tells me' that that is the belief I ought to form. That is, whenever I conclude that p is true, (N) 'gives me a reason' to believe that p. And whenever I conclude that not p, it 'gives me a reason' to believe not p.
Hence, (N) never gives me a reason to believe anything but what I have already come to believe anyway. Intuitively, no more guidance is to be had from (N) than from an oracle that invariably tells you to figure out what to do yourself. 4 Are there propositions that ought to be believed under all, or no, circumstances? Possibly, but that is irrelevant here. 'Under all circumstances, believe p' is not a truth norm. 5 Note that this holds regardless of whether the point is formulated in terms of explicit deliberation, or merely in terms of the possibility of rationalizing reconstruction. 6 There is, of course, also a regress problem lurking here: If following, or being guided by, a rule requires forming a belief about the antecedent conditions, not all belief formation can be rule guided, on pain of a regress. This would be a version of what we call the regress of motivations in the paper. Cf. Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 55-59 , where some such regresses are spelled out in more detail with regard to the 'norms of rationality'.
Steglich-Petersen, however, goes on to argue that it does not help our case to point out that (ii) determining whether p is true simply amounts to forming a belief as to whether p This does not help, he argues, because it is perfectly possible to determine whether p without thereby determining whether one has formed a belief as to whether p. After all, someone may lack the concept of belief and still form the belief that p. We agree that this is perfectly possible. But it is irrelevant to the truth of (ii), and therefore does not prevent (ii) from playing an important role in the no guidance argument. The possibility of forming a belief without thereby forming the corresponding meta-belief would be relevant to the no guidance argument only if we did indeed claim that the antecedent of the truth norm really was 'about'
beliefs. But we do not.
Finally, Steglich-Petersen considers the following rejoinder that might be made on our behalf:
(iii) The formation of the first belief must be in accordance with the truth norm. But then the norm simply says 'believing p is correct only if believing p is correct' and no guidance can be had from such a norm.
He responds by pointing out that one can form a correct belief as to whether p without thereby forming a belief as to whether believing p is correct. Hence, even if applying the norm required forming a correct belief as to whether p, it would not follow that one must determine whether believing p is correct in order to determine whether the antecedent condition obtains.
Here, too, Steglich-Petersen relies on the difference between forming an object-level belief (the belief that p) and a meta-level belief (the belief that the belief that p is correct). And
